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Child Labor and School Achievement in Latin America 
Victoria Gunnarsson, Peter F. Orazem, and Mario A. Sánchez 
  
Abstract:  Child labor’s effect on academic achievement is estimated, using unique data on 3rd 
and 4th graders in 9 Latin American countries. Cross-country variation in truancy regulations 
provides an exogenous shift in the ages of children normally in these grades, providing 
exogenous variation in opportunity cost of child time.  Least-squares estimates of the impact of 
child labor on test scores are biased downward, but corrected estimates are still negative and 
statistically significant.  Children working one standard deviation above the mean have average 
scores that are 16% lower on mathematics exams and 11% lower on language exams, consistent 
with estimates of the adverse impact of child labor on returns to schooling. 
 
About one of every eight children in the world is engaged in market work.  Despite 
general acceptance that child labor is harmful and despite international accords aimed at its 
eradication, progress on lowering the incidence of child labor has been slow.  While often 
associated with poverty, child labor has persisted in some countries that have experienced 
substantial improvements in living standards.  For example, Latin America, with several 
countries in the middle or middle-upper income categories, still has child labor participation rates 
that are similar to the world average.  
Countries have adopted various policies to combat child labor.  Most have opted for legal 
prohibitions, but these are only as effective as the enforcement.  As many child labor 
relationships are in informal settings within family enterprises, enforcement is often difficult.  
Several countries, particularly in Latin America, have initiated programs that offer households an 
income transfer in exchange for the household keeping their children in school and/or out of the 
labor market. 
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Presumably, governments invest resources to lower child time in the labor market in 
anticipation that the child will devote more time to acquisition of human capital.  The 
government’s return will come from higher average earnings and reduced outlays for poverty 
alleviation when the child matures.  However, despite a huge acceleration in the research on 
child labor, there is surprisingly little evidence that relates child labor to schooling outcomes in 
developing countries.1  In fact, most children who work are also in school, suggesting that 
perhaps child labor does not lower schooling attainment.  Additionally, studies that examine the 
impact of child labor on test scores have often found negligible effects, although most of these 
are in developed country contexts.  More recently, Heady (2003), and Rosati and Rossi (2003) 
have found some evidence that child labor lowers primary school test scores in developing 
countries. 
This study builds on these last two papers by examining the linkage between child labor 
and school achievement in 9 countries in Latin America.  The current study benefits from more 
detailed data sets that allow controls for child, household, school, and community variables, and 
it makes use of an empirical strategy that controls for the likely endogeneity of child labor.  Our 
results are very consistent: in all 9 countries, child labor lowers performance on tests of language 
and mathematics proficiency, even when controlling for school and household attributes and for 
the joint causality between child labor and school outcomes.  To the extent that lower cognitive 
attainment translates to lower future earnings, as argued by Glewwe (2002), these results suggest 
that there is a payoff in the form of higher future earnings from investing in lowering the 
incidence of child labor. 
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I.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most studies that analyze the relationship between time at work and school attainment 
have focused on high school or college students in developed countries.2  These studies have 
generally found little evidence that part-time work combined with schooling hurts school 
achievement.  When adverse effects are found, they are only apparent at relatively high work 
hours.  Important exceptions include recent papers by Tyler (2003) and Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2003) that found that after controlling for likely endogeneity of child labor, 
working while in school led to much larger implied declines in high school math scores and in 
college G.P.A.s than had been found previously.  Post and Pong (2000) also found a negative 
association between work and test scores in samples of 8th graders in many of the 23 countries 
they studied.3 
There are several reasons why the experience of older working students may not extend 
to the experience of young children working in developing countries.   Young children may be 
less physically able to combine work with school, so that working children may be too tired to 
learn efficiently in school or to study afterwards. Children who are tired are also more prone to 
illness or injury that can retard academic development. It is possible that working at a young age 
disrupts the attainment of basic skills more than it disrupts the acquisition of applied skills for 
older students. School and work, which may be complementary activities once a student has 
mastered literacy and numeracy, may not be compatible before those basic skills are mastered. 
Past research on the consequences of child labor on schooling in developing countries has 
concentrated on the impact of child labor on school enrollment or attendance. Here the evidence 
is mixed. Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) and Ravallion and Wodon (2000) found that child 
labor and school enrollment were not mutually exclusive activities and could even be 
complementary activities. However, Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) and Levy (1985) found 
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evidence that stronger child labor markets lowered school enrollment. There is stronger evidence 
that child labor lowers time spent in human capital production, even if it does not lower 
enrollment per se. Psacharopoulos (1997) and Sedlacek et al. (2005) reported that child labor 
lowered years of school completed and Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) discovered that 
child labor lowered study time.  
Nevertheless, school enrollment and attendance are not ideal measures of the potential 
harm of child labor on learning because they are merely indicators of the time input into 
schooling and not the learning outcomes. Even if child labor lowers time in school, it may not 
hinder human capital production if children can use their limited time in school efficiently.  This 
is particularly true if the schools are of such poor quality that not much learning occurs in the 
first place. On the other hand, the common finding that most working children are enrolled in 
school may miss the adverse consequences of child labor on learning if child labor is not 
complementary with the learning process at the lower grades. A more accurate assessment of the 
impact of child labor on human capital production requires measures of learning outcomes, such 
as test scores rather than time in school, to determine whether child labor limits or enhances 
human capital production.  Moreover, evidence suggests that cognitive skills, rather than years of 
schooling, are the fundamental determinants of adult wages in developing countries (Glewwe 
1996;  Moll 1998). Therefore, identifying the impact of child labor on school achievement will 
yield more direct implications for child labor’s longer term impacts on earnings and poverty 
status later in the child’s life. 
Direct evidence of child labor on primary school achievement is quite rare. Heady (2003) 
found that child work had little effect on school attendance but had a substantial effect on 
learning achievement in reading and mathematics in Ghana. Rosati and Rossi (2003) report that 
in Pakistan and Nicaragua, rising hours of child labor is associated with poorer test scores. Both 
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of these studies have weaknesses related to data limitations. Heady treated child labor as 
exogenous, but it is plausible that parents send their children to work in part because of poor 
academic performance. Rosati and Rossi had no information on teacher or school characteristics, 
although these are likely to be correlated with the strength of local child labor markets.  
This study makes several important contributions to existing knowledge of the impact of 
child labor on schooling outcomes in developing countries. First, it shows how child labor affects 
test scores in 9 developing countries, greatly expanding the scope of existing research.  Because 
the same exam was given in all countries, we can illustrate how the effect of child labor on 
cognitive achievement varies across countries that differ greatly in child labor incidence, per 
capita income, and school quality. Because the countries also differ in the regulation and 
enforcement of child labor laws, we can utilize cross-country variation in schooling ages and 
truancy laws to provide plausible instruments for endogenous child labor. Finally, because the 
data set includes a wealth of information on parent, family, community, and school attributes, we 
can estimate the impact of child labor on schooling outcomes, holding fixed other inputs 
commonly assumed to explain variation in schooling outcomes across children. The results are 
very consistent. Child labor lowers student achievement in every country. The conclusions are 
robust to alternative estimation procedures and specifications. We conclude that child labor has a 
significant opportunity cost in the form of foregone human capital production, a cost that may 
not be apparent when only looking at enrollment rates for working children. 
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II.  EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 Ben Porath (1967) laid out the classic model of human capital investments over the life 
cycle.  There are diminishing marginal returns to time in school because of concavity in the 
human capital production process and because the opportunity cost of allocating time to further 
skill acquisition increases as skills are accumulated.  In addition, finite life spans limit the length 
of time to capture returns from schooling as age increases, further decreasing the marginal 
returns to time in school as age rises.  All of these factors suggest that time invested in human 
capital production will decrease as an individual ages.  However, early in life, children may 
specialize in schooling if the present value of the return is sufficiently high relative to its current 
marginal cost.4 
We are interested in the tradeoff parents face in deciding whether the child should 
specialize in schooling or should divide time between school and work.  By age t, the child has 
completed Et years of schooling.  In addition, the child has matured for t years.  The opportunity 
cost of child school time is assumed to rise with Et and t, and is also a function of local labor 
market conditions Zt.  The returns to time in school will depend on how much the child is 
expected to learn, Qt.  A vector of observable parent, home, school and community variables, Ht 
may affect tastes for child labor as well as affecting the productivity of child time in school 
through Qt.  The child’s labor supply function will be of the form 
(1)   Ct = c(Et, t, Z t, Qt, Ht, ε t) 
where ε t is a random error. 
 The human capital production process is assumed to depend on past human capital 
accumulations, current factors that would make the child’s time in school more productive and 
the time spent in school.  Letting Qt be an observable measure of cognitive skills produced in 
school, the human capital production process will be of the form 
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(2) Qt = q(Et, t, C t, H t, tη ) 
where tη  is a component of cognitive ability that the parents can observe but not the 
econometrician. 
 Because the decision on whether or how much the child works is based in part on the 
parents’ knowledge of tη , and because student outcomes are influenced by child labor, 
Var( tε , 0) ≠tη , and ordinary least squares estimation of (2) will be biased.  Short of a 
randomized experiment that assigns children into working and not working groups, the best 
candidate to resolve the problem will be to find variables that shift the probability that a child 
works but do not directly affect child learning in school.  We will rely on variables that alter the 
local labor market for child labor, Zt, to provide exogenous shifts in the child labor equation in 
estimating equation (2).  
 
Factors Shifting the Probability of Child Labor 
 We require elements of the vector Zt that alter the local labor market for children but do 
not affect test scores.  Because the probability of working rises with age, factors that alter the age 
at which a child would normally be in a given grade will also affect the probability that the child 
will be working.  In Latin America, the age at which children are expected to start school varies 
across countries from 5 to 7 years of age.  The age until which children must remain in school 
varies from 12 to 16 years of age.  As a consequence, children must attend school as few as five 
years in Honduras to as many as 10 years in Peru. 
 These differences in laws regulating child labor and school attendance alter the age at 
which children would normally enter grades 3 and 4, and thus vary the opportunity costs between 
countries of being in those grades.  Children starting school earlier will be younger at grade 3 
and will be more likely to attend school full time without working.  Third and fourth graders in 
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countries with the lowest working ages are more likely to appear legal, even if they are under 12 
years of age.  Therefore, children in countries with low truancy ages will be more likely to be 
working while attending school. 
 An alternative measure of the opportunity cost of attending school would be the local 
market wage for children.  Because most child labor is unpaid work for family enterprises, 
however, market wages would not adequately capture the value of time outside school even if 
such information were available.  Instead, we utilize the presumed upward relationship between 
the marginal productivity of child labor and the child’s age which we assume is driven largely by 
physical stature.5  Interactions between measures of a country’s school starting age or truancy 
age and child age are used to capture exogenous variation across countries in the probability that 
third and fourth graders work.  These shifts in the net return to time in school provide the needed 
exogenous shift in C.6    
 Within countries, the largest source of variation in demand for child labor occurs across 
rural and urban areas.  There are more uses for child labor in rural markets, and so rural child 
labor force participation rates exceed that for urban children in all the countries in this study.  We 
capture that source of variation with interactions between child age and a dummy variable 
indicating rural residence for boys and girls. 
 We will illustrate how these elements of Zt affect the probability of engaging in child 
labor in figures 1-3 discussed below. 
Factors Affecting School Outcomes 
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Estimation of equation (2) follows the educational production function literature in that Q 
is measured by test scores that are explained by variables characterizing the student’s parents, 
household, teacher, school and community (Hanushek 1995). Measures used include most of 
those that have been found to be important in developing country settings (Hanushek 1995; 
Kremer 1995). 
Estimates of educational production functions are subject to numerous biases.7  Among 
the most commonly discussed is the lack of adequate control for the student's innate ability.8 
Many studies have attempted to correct for the problem by using two test scores taken at 
different times.  If ability has an additive effect on school achievement, the difference between 
the two output measures will be purged of the ability effect. The data for the current study only 
includes tests taken at one point in time, so the differencing option is not available.  However, 
there are reasons why undifferenced data may yield satisfactory or even preferred estimates to 
the differenced data.  As Glewwe (2002) argues, if measures of Ht vary slowly over time, the 
value of the differenced measure of achievement is minimal. This is more likely to be true at the 
earliest stages of schooling where there is less variation in curriculum, educational materials or 
teacher training.  Furthermore, the use of parental attributes such as education and income should 
partially control for inherited ability.  Finally, if there is considerable measurement error in 
estimates of Qt, the level of Qt may be measured more reliably than the change in Qt. In any 
event, the results of the production function estimation in this study should be interpreted as 
cumulative as of grade 3 or 4 rather than the additional learning obtained in that grade. 
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III.  DATA 
 In 1997, the Latin-American Laboratory of Quality of Education (LLECE) carried out the 
First Comparative International Study on Language, Mathematics and Associated Factors for 3rd 
and 4th graders in Latin America. LLECE collected data initially in 13 countries, but the required 
information for our regression analysis was only available for 9: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Honduras,  Paraguay, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.9  
The data set is composed of a stratified sample designed to insure sufficient observations 
of public, private, rural, urban and metropolitan students in each country. Data were collected on 
40 children from each of 100 schools in each country for a total of 4,000 observations per 
country. Half of the students were in the 3rd grade and half in the 4th grade. For budgetary 
reasons, LLECE had to use a priori geographic exclusions to limit the transportation and time 
costs of data collection. Very small schools with too few 3rd and 4th graders and schools in 
remote, difficult to access, or sparsely inhabited regions were excluded. Because of the cost of 
translating exams, schools with bilingual or indigenous language instruction were also 
excluded.10  As the excluded schools would cater to relatively more disadvantaged populations, 
our results should be viewed as applying to school populations that are less rural, from more 
majority ethnic groups and somewhat more advantaged than average for all Latin American 
children.  
 
Test Scores 
Survey instruments consisted of tests administered to the sample of children of the 
sampled schools, and self-applied questionnaires to school principals (Pr), to the teachers (T) and 
parents (or legal guardians) (P) of the tested children, and to the children themselves (C). In 
addition, surveyors collected information on the socioeconomic characteristics of the community 
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(S). A description of the variables used in the Latin America analysis can be found in Table 1. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.11 
{Tables 1 and 2 about here} 
All children were tested in mathematics, and all were tested in Spanish except the 
Brazilian children who were tested in Portuguese. It should be noted that the tests and 
questionnaires were given only to children who attend school, so no information was obtained on 
children who are not in school. Therefore the results can only be applied to enrolled children. If 
working children who perform most poorly in school drop out to work full time, our estimate of 
the consequences of child labor on schooling outcomes may miss some of those most harmed by 
child labor while including children who can work and still perform well in school. However, 
95% of children aged 9-11 are enrolled in Latin America, so the bias is likely to be modest.12  In 
other settings where primary enrollment rates are much lower, the bias could be substantial.  
 
Child Labor 
Child labor is measured by each child’s response to a question asking whether s/he is 
engaged in work outside the home.13 Our concentration on paid work outside the home avoids 
some definitional problems related to distinguishing between unpaid work for home enterprise 
from household chores.  However, it is also apparent in our application that child labor in the 
home does not have the same apparent negative consequences on student achievement as does 
work outside the home. 
Table 3 reports child labor participation rates and average test scores for children by 
whether they work inside and/or outside the home.  The first two columns give the average 
language and mathematics test scores for children reporting they worked outside the home often, 
sometimes or never for nine of the countries.14  The percentage increase or decrease in average 
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test scores for the groups working less intensively relative to the average for those who work 
often are reported in parentheses.  Across all 9 countries and two achievement tests, 18 cases in 
all, the pattern never varies. Children who work only some of the time outperform those who 
often work. Children who almost never work outperform those who work sometimes or often. 
The differences are almost always statistically significant. The advantage is large for children 
who almost never work over those who often work, averaging 22%  on the mathematics exam 
and 27% on the language exam. The test advantage for occasional child laborers is smaller but 
still significant at 8.4% for mathematics and 9% for languages. 
{Table 3 about here} 
 Children were asked a similar question regarding how intensively they worked inside the 
home.  It seems that working inside the home is less costly in terms of human capital 
development in schools.  Taking the average across all countries, those who work often inside 
the home have average test scores only 7% lower than those who almost never work inside the 
home, and only 4% lower than those who sometimes work in the home.  The test score gaps for 
those working outside the home were considerably larger.  Furthermore, in only 3 of the 9 
countries were average test scores significantly higher for children almost never working in the 
home relative to those often working in the home.  In 3 other countries, those often working in 
the home had higher average test scores than did those rarely working in the home.   
 Nevertheless, there is a more basic reason that we do not analyze the implications of 
working inside the home on student achievement:  over 95% reported working in the home 
sometime or often with nearly identical incidence of reported home work for girls and boys and 
for urban and rural children.  This lack of meaningful variation in child work in the home means 
that the pattern of test scores against home work intensity is unlikely to be reliable.  In fact, 
empirical models we attempted could not distinguish statistically between children who did or 
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did not work in the home—everyone was predicted to participate in household labor.  It is 
possible that work in the home is damaging to schooling outcomes, but our data lack sufficient 
variation in measured household work to capture the effect.  For these reasons, we concentrate 
our analysis on child labor outside the home. 
 
Exogenous Variables 
 We rely on the presumed positive relationship between age and the value of child time 
working outside the home to identify the child labor equation.  This relationship varies across 
urban and rural areas and between boys and girls.  It also appears to shift as children reach 10 
years of age or more.  We allow this effect with a spline defined as follows.  A dummy variable, 
d10, takes the value of one for children under 10 and zero otherwise.  For children aged 10 and 
over, the age effect is allowed to captured by interactions between (1-d10) and age.  
 The countries included in our data differ in legal regulations governing the age at which 
children enter school and when they can legally exit. Information on compulsory schooling laws 
for each country was obtained from the UNESCO (2002).  These laws were allowed to shift the 
age-child labor relationship beyond age 10, using interaction terms of the form AGE*(1-
d10)*LAGE where LAGE is the legal age of school entry or school exit.15   
The child’s value of time in school will depend on how much the child can learn.  This 
will depend on the availability of home attributes that are complementary with child time in 
school such as books and parental education; and on the quality of the school.  Most of these 
measures are self-explanatory. However, some of the school variables merit some comment. The 
measure of the classroom environment, inadequacy, is a weighted average of several measures of 
poor school infrastructure and supplies. Teachers were asked the extent to which they judged 
classroom lighting, classroom temperature, classroom hygiene, classroom security, classroom 
 14
acoustics, language textbooks, mathematics textbooks and other textbooks to be inadequate. The 
weighted sum of the responses is used as the aggregate index of school shortages, where the 
weights were taken as the first principal component from a factor analysis of the teachers’ 
responses.  The number of Spanish or Portuguese speaking students is included as a measure of 
the cost of providing schooling services.  As the number of nonnative speakers of the language 
of instruction increases, resources must be diverted to second-language instruction, potentially 
limiting school productivity.  
 
IV.  ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
The results in Table 3 suggest a strong negative effect of child market labor on school 
achievement, but the effect may be in the reverse direction–poor schooling outcomes leading to 
child labor. The direction of this bias is difficult to predict.  The most plausible is that poor 
school performers are sent to work so that the least squares coefficient on child labor will be 
biased downward.  However, Both Tyler (2003) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) 
found biases in the opposite direction for older students, so the better students were more likely 
to work.  Measurement error in the self-reported incidence of child labor could also bias the 
estimated coefficient of child labor on schooling outcomes. The cumulative direction of these 
sources of bias cannot be established, but both simultaneity and measurement error can be 
handled by the use of plausible instruments that alter the probability of engaging in child labor 
without directly affecting test scores.  
The first step in the estimation process is to predict child labor. Our categorical measure 
of child market work includes 0 (almost never work); 1 (sometime work); and 2 (often work). 
We use an ordered probit specification to estimate equation (1), using child, parent, school, and 
community variables to explain variation in market work.  Predicted child labor from (1) is used 
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as the measure of C in estimating equation (2). This two-stage estimation leads to consistent, but 
inefficient estimates of the parameters of the achievement equation. To correct for the 
inefficiency in the estimators we utilize a bootstrapping method in which 100 samples with 
replacement are drawn from the original data, subjected to the ordered probit estimation and then 
inserted into the second stage achievement equation in order to simulate the sampling variation 
in the estimates. The bootstrap standard errors are reported for the test score equations. 
 
V.  DETERMINANTS OF CHILD LABOR 
 Estimates from the probit child labor supply equation are reported in Table 4.  These 
estimates are needed to identify the effect of child labor on test scores, but also have interest in 
their own right.  The estimation makes use of the dependent variables reported in Table 3 except 
that data for Venezuela and Mexico had to be dropped because child age was not reported. 
Because the two samples are not identical, we report separate estimates for the samples of 
children taking the mathematics and language exams. The coefficients on the age interacted 
variables differ somewhat across the two samples, but the overall relationship between age and 
child labor is similar between the two samples.  The other coefficient estimates are very similar 
across the two samples. 
 {Table 4 about here} 
 Boys are more likely than girls to work outside the home, and rural boys and girls work 
more than their urban counterparts, who in turn work more than their metropolitan counterparts. 
Children of more educated parents and children who have access to more books in the home are 
less likely to work outside the home.  School quality also affects the incidence of child labor. 
Schools with inadequate supplies encourage child labor.  Children in schools with more non-
Spanish or non-Portuguese language speakers among their peers are also more likely to work 
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outside the home.  Schools that offer more classes in Spanish/Portuguese and mathematics per 
week also lower the incidence of child labor.  In general, these results suggest that better 
schooling inputs in the home or at school lower the incidence of child labor. The exception is 
that attending preschool does not have a significant effect on child labor in this sample. 
 The joint test of the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables have no effect on child 
labor is easily rejected.  Variation in truancy laws across countries and in the market for boys 
within countries do shift the probability that children work.   We illustrate the impact of these 
laws on the average incidence of child labor in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 illustrates how raising 
the school starting age affects child labor outside the home by age.  The effect was disabled 
below age 10.  As the school starting age rises from age 5 to 7, the probability of child labor rises 
about 6 percentage points for a ten year old, all else equal.  The effect increases to 10 percentage 
points by age 14.  Figure 2 shows how child market labor changes with the school leaving age.  
As the truancy age rises from 12 to 16, the probability of child labor falls by 8.5 percentage 
points for a ten year old.  By age 14, the effect rises to 11.5 percentage points by age 14.  These 
results suggest that truancy laws do have an effect on child labor on average. 
 {Figures 1 and 2 about here} 
Figure 3 illustrates how regional variation in the market for child labor shifts child labor 
supply for boys and girls.  The dummy variable spline effectively fixes child labor intensity for 
children under ten.  After age ten, child labor intensity rises for both boys and girls. In each 
market, boys work more than girls.16  The higher market labor force participation for boys is 
consistent with the presumption that the marginal product of child labor is higher for boys than 
girls.  However, rural girls have higher labor force participation than metropolitain boys. 
{Figure 3 about here} 
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VI.  CHILD LABOR AND SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT 
 Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (2) both with and without controls 
for the endogeneity of child labor.  In the specification in Table 5, when child labor is treated as 
exogenous, it takes the values of 0 (almost never work); 1 (sometime work); or 2 (often work).  
When treated as endogenous, child labor is a continuous variable with domain over the real line 
taken as the fitted values from the ordered probit estimation in Table 4.  The rest of the 
regressors are the child, household, parent and school variables used as regressors in Table 4.17 
 {Table 5 about here} 
 The impact of child labor on test scores is negative and significant whether or not child 
labor is treated as exogenous or endogenous. 18  Because of the difference in the scale of the 
measured child labor across the two specifications, it is difficult to directly compare the 
magnitude of the implied effect of child labor on test scores.  We compare the results in two 
ways.  First, we compute the implied effect of a one standard deviation increase above the mean 
in child labor in each of the equations.  These beta coefficients are reported in brackets below the 
child labor coefficients.  When treated as exogenous, a one standard deviation increase in child 
labor causes both mathematics and language tests scores to fall by about .2 standard deviations.  
In other words, children working one standard deviation above the mean score on average 8% 
lower on mathematics exams and 6% lower on language exams than do otherwise identical 
children working at the mean level.  When controlling for endogeneity, the effect increases to .4 
standard deviation (16%) drop in the mathematics exam and a .3 standard deviation (11%) drop 
in the language exam.   This finding that the magnitude of the child labor effect on academic 
achievement rises after controlling for endogeneity is consistent with results reported by Tyler 
(2003) and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) for older U.S. students. 
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 Another way to compare the two sets of estimates can be found in Figures 4-5 which 
trace out the predicted mathematics and language test scores at each decile of the reported and 
predicted child labor distributions.  At the break points of the exogenous measure (i.e. going 
from child labor level 0 to level 1 at the 40th percentile and from level 1 to level 2 at the 74th 
percentile) the predicted test scores using the reported and corrected measures.  However, the 
relationship is steeper at the upper and lower tails of the distribution of predicted child labor, 
particularly for the mathematics test.  The implication is that by restricting the range of child 
labor to three discrete levels, the impact of child labor on test scores in the first two columns of 
Table 5 is understated.  
 {Figures 4 and 5 about here} 
Glewwe’s (2002) review of the human capital literature in developing countries argued 
that cognitive ability as measured by test scores is strongly tied to later earnings as an adult. We 
would therefore expect that returns to schooling for those who worked as children should be 
lower than for those who did not work, all else equal.  Consistent with that expectation, Ilahi et 
al. (2003) found that, holding constant years of schooling completed, Brazilian adults who 
worked as children received 4 to 11 percent lower returns per year of schooling completed. Our 
estimates suggest that child labor outside the home reduces achievement per year of schooling 
attended by 11 to 16%.  Because many of the third and fourth graders in our sample will repeat 
the grade, our estimates are an upper-bound measure of the lost human capital per year 
completed, and so our results correspond closely in magnitude to their estimates of adverse 
impacts of child labor on earnings. 
 Most of the other variables have similar effects across the two sets of estimates in Table 
5.  There are two main exceptions.  The adverse effects of being a boy or being in a rural school  
disappear in the instrumented equations.  Gender and rural residence are closely tied to the 
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incidence of child labor.  It is likely that the negative effects of being male and being in a rural 
area on test scores is related to the indirect effect of these variables on the higher probability that 
male and rural children work. 
 Parental education and availability of books in the home lose influence on test scores 
after controlling for the endogeneity in child labor.  School attributes also becomes less 
important in explaining test scores.  Again, these factors had strong negative effects on child 
labor, and so part of their positive effect on school outcomes presumably works through their 
impact on child school attendance and reduced time at work.  The literature on the extent to 
which school quality can explain variation in school achievement has emphasized the large 
variation in coefficients for the same school inputs across studies and country settings (Hanushek 
and Luque 2003).  Our results suggest that one reason for the uncertain impact of school 
attributes may be that school quality is more important in affecting child school attendance and 
child labor than in directly affecting test scores. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Working outside the home lowers average school achievement in samples of 3rd and 4th 
graders in each of the 9 Latin American countries studied.  Child labor is shown to have 
significant adverse effects on mathematics and language test scores using various specifications 
correcting for possible endogeneity and measurement error in self-reported child labor intensity.  
Children who work even occasionally score an average of 7 percent lower on language exams 
and 7.5 percent lower on mathematics exams.  There is some evidence that working more 
intensely lowers achievement more, but these results are more speculative in that empirical 
models were unable to distinguish clearly between working “sometime” versus working “often”. 
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These adverse effects of child labor on cognitive ability are consistent in magnitude with 
estimated adverse effects of child labor on earnings as an adult.  Thus, it is plausible that child 
labor serves as a mechanism for intergenerational transmission of poverty, consistent with 
empirical evidence presented by Emerson and Souza (2003) and the theoretical models of 
poverty traps advanced by Basu (2000), Basu and Van (1998), and Baland and Robinson (2000). 
Such large effects suggest that efforts to combat child labor may have substantial payoffs 
in the form of increased future earnings or lower poverty rates once children become adults.  
How to combat child labor is less clear.  Our child labor supply equations suggest that truancy 
laws appear to have some effect in lowering the incidence of child labor.  However, most of the 
variation in child labor occurs within countries and not across countries, so policies must address 
local child labor market and poverty conditions as well as national circumstances in combating 
child labor.  Policies that alter the attractiveness of child labor or bolster household income, such 
as income transfer programs that condition receipt on child enrollment or reduced child labor, are 
likely candidates.  Recent experience on such programs in Brazil, Honduras, Mexico and 
Nicaragua would appear to support further development and expansion of such conditional 
transfer programs. 
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1 Two excellent recent reviews of the recent literature include Basu and Tzannatos (2003) and Edmonds 
and Pavcnik (2005). 
 
2 D’Amico (1984); Ehrenberg and Sherman (1987); Howard (1998); Lillydahl (1990); Singh (1998); Stern 
(1997); and Singh and Ozturk (2000). 
 
3 This study included several developing countries including Colombia, Iran, South Africa, Thailand, and 
the Philippines which had the largest estimated negative effects of child labor on school achievement.  However, the 
estimates do not control for school attributes or possible joint causality between school achievement and child labor. 
 
4 The main predictions are not altered if leisure is added to the model. It will still be optimal to invest more 
intensively in human capital early in life and decreasing investment intensity with age.  In addition, because the cost 
of leisure is the value of work time, individuals will consume the least leisure when wages are highest.  In our 
application, children will consume less leisure as they age, and so older children will still be expected to work more 
than younger children. Heckman (1976) presents a detailed model of human capital investment, leisure demand and 
consumption over the life cycle.  Huffman and Orazem (2005) present a much simplified model that generates the 
predictions discussed in the text. 
 
5 Rosenzweig (1980) found that in a sample of adults, wages for day labor in India were primarily driven 
by stature and not by acquired education.  Wage patterns reported by Ray (2000) for boys and girls in Pakistan and 
Peru suggest rising opportunity costs of child time as age increases.  
 
6 Angrist and Krueger (1991) use variation in compulsory school starting ages across states to instrument 
for endogenous time in school in their analysis of returns to schooling using U.S. Census data.  Tyler (2003) uses 
variation in state child labor laws to instrument for child labor in his study of U.S. high school tests scores.  We 
began with a large number of interactions, but the resulting variables were highly collinear, and so we used a 
parsimonious subset of the fuller specification. 
 
7 See Glewwe (2002) for a comprehensive review of the problems associated with estimating educational 
production functions. 
 
8 Ability bias has also been the subject of numerous papers estimating returns to schooling.  The consensus 
is that the bias is small (Card 1999).  If earnings and cognitive skills are closely tied, as argued by Glewwe (2002), 
then the role of ability bias should be small in educational production estimates also. 
 
9 Costa Rica was included in the initial data collection but LLECE dropped their data due to consistency 
problems. Cuba was excluded due to missing data on child labor.  Mexico and Venezuela lacked required 
information on child age. 
 
10 For a detailed description of the a priori exclusions in each country, consult Table III.6 of the Technical 
Bulletin of the LLECE. 
 
11 For some reason, language scores were reported for two percent fewer students than were mathematics 
scores. The missing scores appear to be due to random reporting errors as there were no large differences between 
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the sample means of the group taking the mathematics and language tests. We report the means from the sample 
taking the mathematics exam. 
 
12 Sedlacek et al. (2005) present data on enrollment by age for 18 Latin American countries. Even for the 
poorest quintile of children, enrollments rates are over 90% for children aged 9-11. 
 
13 As pointed out by a referee, it would be better to have information on hours of work rather than these 
more vague measures of work intensity.  Our instrumental variables procedure later is an attempt to correct for 
biases due to measurement error in child labor. 
 
14 We only report the averages for the subset of countries for which we had data on both language and test 
scores and for which we could match responses for working inside and outside the home.  We only had partial 
information from Mexico and Venezuela, but we can report that the pattern of average test scores for children 
working outside the home in Venezuela and Mexico were the same—children working more outside the home had 
significantly lower average test scores.  Data limitations prevented us from generating the corresponding average 
test scores for children working inside the home for those two countries. 
 
15 We report a more parsimonious specification than the one with all possible interaction terms.  In 
particular, separate coefficients on the dummy variable (1-d10) and their interactions with age, gender and rural 
residence did not add to the explanatory power of the child labor equation. 
 
16 We truncate ages below eight (0.4% of the sample) and above 15 (0.8% of the sample) as we do not 
have sufficient observations at the lower and higher ages to generate reliable child labor supply trajectories. 
 
17 We obtained similar estimates of the adverse effect of child labor on test scores when we used a school-
specific fixed effect to control for the impact of variation in school and community variables instead of the vector of 
school and community variables.    
 
18 The Davidson-MacKinnon (1993, pp. 237-240) variant of the Hausman test easily rejected the 
assumption of exogeneity of child labor.  The overidentification tests of the instruments failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity at the 10th percentile in the language test sample and at the 5th percentile for the 
mathematics test sample.  
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TABLE 1.  Variable Description 
   Endogenous variables 
 
Math Score  Mathematics test score (C) 
Language Score Language test score (C) 
Work Outside  Index of how often student works outside the home (0-2) (C) 
 Often:  Student reports that s/he often works outside the home (C) 
 Sometime:   Student reports that s/he sometimes works outside the home (C) 
 Almost Never:   Student reports that s/he almost never works outside the home (C) 
 
   Exogenous variables 
 
Child 
Age   Student age (years) (C) 
d10 Dummy if student is below 10 years old 
Boy Dummy if student is a boy (C) 
No Preschool  Student did not attend preschool/kindergarten (C)  
 
Parents/Household 
Parent Education Average education of parent(s) or guardian(s) (P) 
Books at Home Number of books in student’s home (P) 
 
School 
Spanish Enrollment  Total number of Spanish (Portuguese) speaking students enrolled (Pr) 
Inadequate Supply  Index of school supply inadequacy (Pr) 
Math/week Number of mathematics classes per week (Pr) 
Spanish/week Number of Spanish (Portuguese) classes per week (Pr) 
 
Community (Reference: Metropolitan area with 1M people or more)  
Urban Dummy variable indicating if school is located in an urban area (2,500-1M people) (S)  
Rural  Dummy variable indicating if school is located in a rural area (less than 2,500 people) (S)  
 
 Instruments 
Legal structure 
Compulsory Start  Compulsory school ending age in the country (U) 
 Compulsory End   Compulsory school ending age in the country (U) 
  
Sources: C: Child survey or test; P: Parent’s survey; T: Teacher’s survey; Pr: Principle’s survey; S: Survey 
Designer’s observation; U: UNESCO estimate (2002). 
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TABLE 2.  Summary Statistics 
Variable  N Mean     Std. Dev.       Min      Max 
   Endogenous variables     
Mathematics Score 20699 14.62 5.87 0 32 
Language Score 20290 11.30 4.22 0 19 
Work Outside  20699 0.86 0.79 0 2 
   Often 20699 0.25 0.43 0 1 
   Sometime 20699 0.36 0.48 0 1 
   Almost Never 20699 0.39 0.49 0 1 
   Exogenous variables     
Child      
Age 20699 9.95 1.59 6 18 
d10 20699 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Boy 20699 0.50 0.50 0 1 
No Preschool 20699 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Parents/Household     
Parent Education 20699 1.66 1.62 0 6 
Books at Home 20699 1.61 1.22 0 4 
School      
Spanish Enrollment 20699 439.51 548.82 0 452 
Inadequacy 20699 3.68 2.73 0 7.93 
Math/Week 20699 4.66 3.35 0 30 
Community       
Urban  20699 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Rural 20699 0.35 0.48 0 1 
   Instruments      
Compulsory Start 20699 5.94 0.74 5 7 
Compulsory End 20699 13.74 1.13 12 16 
Source:  Author’s computations based on LLECE data as described in the text. 
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TABLE 3.  Unconditional Average Language and Mathematics Test Scores, By Country and Type and Level 
of Child Labor for Children Aged 6-18 Years Olda 
 
Working outside of the home Working in the home 
 
 
Language Test 
(Maximum Score = 19) 
Mathematics Test 
(Maximum Score = 32) 
Language Test 
(Maximum Score = 19) 
Mathematics Test 
(Maximum Score = 32) 
Country     
Argentina     
Oftenb 12.0 15.7 13.9 17.9 
Sometimec 13.0** d 17.2** 14.3* 18.6* 
 (8.3%) e (9.6%) (2.9%)  (3.9%) 
Almost Neverf 14.3** 18.4** 14.7* 19.9 ** 
 (19.2%) (17.2%) (5.8%) (11.2%) 
Bolivia     
Often 9.7 14.2 11.2 15.9 
Sometime 10.1* 14.7 11.2 16.0 
 (4.1%) (3.5%) (0.0 %) (0.6%) 
Almost Never 11.3** 15.1** 11.8 17.2* 
 (16.5%) (6.3%) (5.4%) (8.2%) 
Brazil     
Often 11.2 14.4 13.0 16.9 
Sometime 11.7* 15.5** 13.4** 18.0** 
 (4.3%) (7.6%) (3.1%) (6.5%) 
Almost Never 13.5** 17.9** 13.0 17.5 
 (20.5%) (24.3%) (0.0%) (3.6%) 
Chile     
Often 11.3 13.3 13.4 16.7 
Sometime 12.1** 14.8** 13.7 17.3* 
 (7.1%) (11.3%) (2.2%) (3.6%) 
Almost Never 13.5** 16.1** 14.0 17.7* 
 (19.5%) (21.1%) (4.5%) (6.0%) 
Colombia     
Often 9.9 13.9 11.7 15.7 
Sometime 11.1** 15.3** 12.2* 15.8 
 (12.1%) (10.1%) (4.3%) (0.6%) 
Almost Never 12.4** 15.9** 12.2 16.1 
 (25.3%) (14.4%) (4.3%) (2.5%) 
Dominican Rep.     
Often 9.6 12.8 10.3 13.2 
Sometime 9.6 13.2 10.8 13.8 
 (0.0%) (3.1%) (4.8%) (4.5%) 
Almost Never 10.8** 13.2 10.2 12.4 
 (12.5%) (3.1%) (-1.0%) (-6.1%) 
Honduras     
Often 8.9 11.7 10.2 13.2 
Sometime 9.4* 12.3** 10.0 12.7 
 (5.6%) (5.1%) (-2.0%) (-3.8%) 
Almost Never 11.6** 14.5** 9.5 10.8 
 (30.3%) (23.9%) (-6.9%) (-10.6%) 
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Working outside of the home Working in the home 
 
 
Language Test 
(Maximum Score = 
19) 
Mathematics Test 
(Maximum Score = 
32) 
Language Test 
(Maximum Score = 
19) 
Mathematics Test 
(Maximum Score = 
32) 
Country     
Paraguay     
Often 10.2 12.9 12.5 16.4 
Sometime 11.3** 14.9** 13.5** 17.9** 
 (10.8%) (15.5%) (8.0%) (9.1%) 
Almost Never 12.1** 16.4** 11.1 14.8 
 (18.6 %) (27.1%) (-11.2 %) (-9.8%) 
Peru     
Often 8.7 11.0 10.6 12.7 
Sometime 9.5** 11.2 11.0** 13.5** 
 (9.2%) (1.8%) (3.8%) (6.3%) 
Almost Never 11.2** 12.9** 10.6 13.0 
 (28.7%) (17.3%) (0.0%) (2.4%) 
All Countries     
Often 9.9 13.1 11.7 15.4 
Sometime 10.8** 14.2** 12.2** 16.1** 
 (9.0%) (8.4%) (4.3%) (4.5%) 
Almost Never 12.6** 16.0** 12.5** 16.5** 
 (27.3%) (22.1%) (6.8%) (7.1%) 
a  Simple mean test score over all children in the child labor group in the county. b Child often works outside the 
home when not in school. c Child sometimes works outside the home when not in school. d Indicates that difference 
in mean test score from the “often working” group is significant at the 0.05(*) or 0.01(**) level of significance. e 
Percentage difference relative to children who often work outside the home when not in school. f Child never works 
outside the home.  
Source:  Authors’ computations based on LLECE data.
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TABLE 4.  Ordered Probit Regression Results on Child Labor 
Variable           Mathematics               Language 
   Exogenous Variables   
Child   
Age 0.048** -0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Boy 0.291** 0.163** 
 (0.036) (0.037) 
No Preschool -0.016 0.029 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Parents/Household   
Parent Education -0.065** -0.046** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Books at Home -0.080** -0.071** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
School   
Spanish Enrollment/100 -0.004** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Inadequate Supply 0.062** 0.065** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Math/Week  (Spanish/Week) -0.014** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Community   
Rural 0.350** 0.290** 
 (0.033) (0.034) 
Urban 0.197** 0.121** 
 (0.033) (0.031) 
   Instruments  
Boy*Rural -0.019 0.144** 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
Boy*Urban -0.062 0.103** 
 (0.043) (0.044) 
Age*Compulsory Start*(1-d10) 0.004** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age*Compulsory End*(1-d10) -0.002** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
LL -21623.743 -21179.099 
Pseudo-R2 0.034 0.034 
N 20699 20290 
** indicates significance at the 0.05 confidence level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 confidence level.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions also include dummy variables that control for missing values. 
Source: Authors’ computations based on LLECE data. 
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TABLE 5.  Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Equations on Test Scores 
         Child Labor Exogenousa         Child Labor Endogenousb 
Variable    Mathematics      Language  Mathematics      Language 
Work Outside -1.184** -1.087** -7.603** -3.980** 
 (0.051) (0.036) (1.248) (0.484) 
Beta Coefficientc [-0.159] [-0.204] [-0.408] [-0.295] 
Child     
Age 0.097** 0.045** 0.309** 0.162** 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.070) (0.024) 
Boy 0.731** -0.165** 2.480** 0.679** 
 (0.079) (0.056) (0.358) (0.155) 
No Preschool -0.256** -0.181** -0.376** -0.079** 
 (0.093) (0.066) (0.088) (0.040) 
Parents/Household     
Parent Education 0.327** 0.280** -0.107 0.134** 
 (0.036) (0.026) (0.106) (0.042) 
Books at Home 0.735** 0.497** 0.196** 0.258** 
 (0.061) (0.042) (0.100) (0.037) 
School     
Spanish Enrollment/100 -0.046** 0.022** -0.079** 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) 
Inadequate Supply -0.329** -0.357** 0.073 -0.140** 
 (0.046) (0.031) (0.096) (0.038) 
Math/week  (Spanish/week)  0.027 0.022** -0.073** -0.049** 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) 
Community     
Urban 0.730** 0.240** 1.847** 0.794** 
 (0.107) (0.076) (0.225) (0.117) 
Rural -0.692** -0.893** 1.641** 0.275 
 (0.122) (0.087) (0.410) (0.202) 
Constant 13.778** 10.657** 14.400** 8.045** 
  (0.446) (0.248) (0.453) (0.391) 
R2 0.084 0.127 0.063 0.091 
N         20699         20290         20699         20290 
a Standard errors in parentheses. b  Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 
confidence level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 confidence level. c The beta coefficients indicates the number of 
standard deviation the test score will change from a one standard deviation increase in child labor. Regressions also 
include dummy variables controlling for missing values. 
Source:  Authors’ computations based on LLECE data. 
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